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I.  INTRODUCTION 
I am pleased to have this opportunity to return to my consideration of the Ohio 
Constitution.3  Cleveland-Marshall College of Law and the Law Review should be 
commended for taking the Ohio Constitution seriously.4  This Law School, through 
the work of Professor Steve Werber, has already made a major contribution to state 
constitutional law through the analysis of Ohio’s controversial tort reform 
confrontation between the Ohio Supreme Court and the Ohio Legislature.5  As 
Professor Richard Kay of the University of Connecticut School of Law has observed: 
The transformation of a law school from an institution of vocational 
competence into one of intellectual excellence is often associated with an 
increased attention to legal subjects that are national in scope....It is also 
true, however, that this broadening of interest need not be accompanied by 
                                                                
1This is an expanded version of a presentation made at Cleveland-Marshall College of 
Law at a program entitled “The Ohio Constitution—Then and Now: An Examination of the 
Law and History of the Ohio Constitution on the Occasion of Its Bicentennial,” on Friday, 
April 25, 2003. 
2Distinguished Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law, Camden; Associate 
Director, Center for State Constitutional Studies. 
3Robert F. Williams, Introduction: State Constitutional Law in Ohio and in the Nation, 16 
U. TOL. L. REV. 391 (1985). 
4See Robert C. Welsh & Ronald K.L. Collins, Taking State Constitutions Seriously, 
CENTER MAG., Sept.-Oct. 1981, at 6. 
5Stephen J. Werber, Ohio Tort Reform in 1998: The War Continues, 45 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 
539 (1997); Stephen J. Werber, Ohio Tort Reform versus the Ohio Constitution, 69 TEMPLE L. 
REV. 1155 (1996); Stephen J. Werber, Ohio: A Microcosm of Tort Reform versus State 
Constitutional Mandates, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 1045 (2000). 
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2004
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an abandonment of a special concern for the legal issues and problems 
that are peculiar to a law school’s home.6 
State constitutions have far-reaching importance on questions of how we govern 
ourselves, and have major consequences for state citizens beyond the area of rights 
protections.7  Despite this fact, it is in the area of rights that state constitutional law 
has received the most attention.  The renewed interest in state constitutional rights, 
referred to as the New Judicial Federalism (NJF), dates from the early 1970s.8  The 
NJF describes the process in which state courts9 interpret their state constitutions to 
provide rights beyond the national minimum (“federal floor”) of rights recognized by 
the U.S. Supreme Court interpreting the federal constitution.  This development was 
referred to by Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. as “probably the most important 
development in constitutional jurisprudence of our times.”10  Jon Teaford has 
recently argued that the NJF is an important element in the late twentieth-century rise 
in importance of state government.11  Another scholar noted that “[w]ith the power to 
                                                                
6Richard S. Kay, The Jurisprudence of the Connecticut Constitution, 16 CONN. L. REV. 
667, 667 (1984) (paragraph break omitted). 
7See generally Robert F. Williams, The Brennan Lecture: Interpreting State Constitutions 
as Unique Legal Documents, 27 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 189 (2002)[hereinafter Brennan 
Lecture]; Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Law Processes, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
169 (1983). 
8See generally Robert F. Williams, Foreword: Looking Back at the New Judicial 
Federalism’s First Generation, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. xiii (1996).  Dr. G. Alan Tarr has argued 
that prior to the beginning of the 1970s, the conditions were not right for the development of 
an expansive state constitutional rights jurisprudence.  He noted:  
Only when circumstances brought a combination of state constitutional arguments, 
plus an example of how a court might develop constitutional guarantees, could a state 
civil liberties jurisprudence emerge.  Put differently, when the Burger Court’s 
anticipated — and to some extent actual — retreat from the Warren Court activism 
encouraged civil liberties litigants to look elsewhere for redress, the experience of the 
preceding decade had laid the foundation for the development of state civil liberties 
law.  Paradoxically, then, the activism of the Warren Court, which has been often 
portrayed as detrimental to federalism, was a necessary condition for the emergence of 
vigorous state involvement in protecting civil liberties. 
G. Alan Tarr, The New Judicial Federalism in Perspective, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1097, 
1111-12 (1997) (paragraph break omitted). 
9Federal courts, of course, may be faced with state constitutional questions under their 
supplemental jurisdiction.  See City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283 
(1982); Robert A. Shapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: State Constitutions in the Federal Courts, 
87 CAL. L. REV. 1409 (1999). 
10Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Special Supplement, State Constitutional Law, NAT’L 
L.J., Sept. 29, 1986, at S1; accord Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Symposium on the 
Revolution in State Constitutional Law—Foreword, 13 VT. L. REV. 11, 11 (1988) (calling the 
movement “the most significant development in American constitutional jurisprudence 
today”); Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual 
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 495 (1977). 
11JON C. TEAFORD, THE RISE OF THE STATES: EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN STATE 
GOVERNMENT 208-16 (2002).  See also LAURA LANGER, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN STATE SUPREME 
COURTS 1 (2002): 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol51/iss3/7
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resolve the vast proportion of the nation’s legal disputes, and with recent shifts in 
federal-state relations, the ability of state courts to affect the distribution of wealth 
and power in the United States is at its zenith.”12 
II.  THE NEW JUDICIAL FEDERALISM IN OHIO 
Despite its beginnings in the early 1970s, and its recognition by almost all states 
in one case or another by the 1980s, Ohio was quite a latecomer.13  One explanation 
for this is that there are substantial legitimacy questions that have been raised 
concerning state courts’ willingness to “disagree” with the U.S. Supreme Court.14  As 
noted by Alan Tarr:   
For federal constitutional law, the primary legitimacy concern has 
involved the relation between the United States Supreme Court and other 
purportedly more democratic branches, such as Congress or state 
legislatures.  For state constitutional law, in contrast, the major legitimacy 
concern has involved the relation between state courts and the U.S. 
Supreme Court: when can a state court interpret its state guarantees to 
reach a result different from that obtained by the Supreme Court 
interpreting the Federal Constitution?15 
For whatever reasons, and there are no doubt others, Ohio did not embrace the NJF 
until only a decade ago, in the 1993 case of Arnold v. City of Cleveland.16  Arnold 
has become the standard citation supporting the independent force of the Ohio 
Constitution. 
                                                          
Increasingly judges on these state courts of last resort are called upon to determine the 
constitutional fate of state legislation across a range of policy.  As a result, many 
policies governing the daily lives of citizens are resolved by the votes of state supreme 
court justices; these actors often become the final arbiters of state public policy. 
12Melinda Gann Hall, State Judicial Politics: Rules, Structures, and the Political Game, in 
AMERICAN STATE AND LOCAL POLITICS 114-15 (Ronald E. Weber & Paul Brace eds., 1999). 
13Mary Cornelia Porter & G. Alan Tarr, The New Judicial Federalism and the Ohio 
Supreme Court: Anatomy of a Failure, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 143 (1984).  For more recent literature 
on the Ohio Supreme Court, see Paul D. Carrington & Adam R. Long, The Independence and 
Democratic Accountability of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 455 (2002); 
Robert S. Peck, Tort Reform’s Threat to an Independent Judiciary, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 835 
(2002).  See generally G. ALAN TARR & MARY CORNELIA ALDIS PORTER, STATE SUPREME 
COURTS IN STATE AND NATION (1988). 
14See generally Robert F. Williams, In the Supreme Court’s Shadow: Legitimacy of State 
Rejection of Supreme Court Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C. L. REV. 353 (1984) [hereinafter In 
the Supreme Court’s Shadow]; Robert F. Williams, In the Glare of the Supreme Court: 
Continuing Methodology and Legitimacy Problems in Independent State Constitutional Rights 
Adjudication, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1015 (1997) [hereinafter In the Glare of the Supreme 
Court].   
15G. Alan Tarr, Constitutional Theory and State Constitutional Interpretation, 22 RUTGERS 
L.J. 841, 853 (1991).  See also G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 175 
(1998). 
16Arnold v. City of Cleveland, 67 Ohio St. 3d 35, 616 N.E.2d 163 (1993). 
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2004
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A.  Thrill of Discovery   
The development of the NJF nationally has been characterized by three distinct 
stages.17  The first is the “thrill of discovery” stage, most often characterized by a 
single breakthrough or “teaching opinion”18 which declares the state constitution to 
be an independent force, and serves as a wake-up call to the bench, bar, legal 
academy, and media.  The second stage, experienced in many states, is a “backlash” 
against this independent approach to the state constitution, which often results in the 
recognition of rights, often for criminal defendants, beyond the national minimum 
standards established by the U.S. Supreme Court.19  Next, in the third stage, state 
courts settled down to the long hard task of actually developing understandable 
doctrines of judicial interpretation under the state constitution’s various provisions.20  
Finally, a fourth stage that as of now is only an ideal, would reflect a true dialogue 
between federal and state judges, as well as academic commentators on 
constitutional theory, concerning the content of rights protection as a shared 
enterprise between federal and state constitutional law.21 
Professor Paul Kahn argued that state courts and federal courts should work 
together, using both state constitutions and the U.S Constitution to pursue the 
“common enterprise” of providing interpretive answers to great constitutional 
questions.22  Professor Lawrence Friedman has elaborated the elements and benefits 
of a true constitutional dialogue between state courts and the U.S. Supreme Court on 
shared constitutional issues.23  Professor Friedman has argued that insofar as the NJF 
reflects attempts by state courts independently to interpret the meaning of cognate 
textual provisions, its legitimacy is buoyed by the federal constitutional value of 
dialogue—that is, the value that attaches to discourse about law and governance that 
occurs between and among the different organs of the federal and state 
governments.24 
Still, it must be remembered that each state constitution has its own text.  The 
textual focus is an important way to distinguish the interpretation of a state 
constitution from the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretations of the federal 
constitution. 
                                                                
17Robert F. Williams, Introduction: The Third Stage of the New Judicial Federalism, 59 
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 211 (2003). 
18Id. at 213; see Williams, In the Glare of the Supreme Court, supra note 14, at 1019 
(describing a “teaching opinion” as “alerting the bar and bench to the possibilities of 
independent state constitutional analysis and educating them in the techniques of making state 
constitutional arguments”). 
19Williams, supra note 17, at 215. 
20Id. at 219.  But see James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 
90 MICH. L. REV. 761 (1992). 
21Williams, supra note 17, at 223.   
22Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 HARV. L. 
REV. 1147, 1168 (1993). 
23Lawrence Friedman, The Constitutional Value of Dialogue and the New Judicial 
Federalism, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 93, 112-23 (2000). 
24Id. at 97. 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol51/iss3/7
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As noted above, the NJF burst on the scene in Ohio in the 1993 decision in 
Arnold v. City of Cleveland.25  This was a challenge to the City of Cleveland’s ban 
on assault weapons.  The Ohio Supreme Court emphasized the differing language 
under the Ohio Constitution in comparison to the federal Second Amendment.  
Article I, Section 4 of the Ohio Constitution provides:   
The people have the right to bear arms for their defense and security; but 
standing armies, in time of peace, are dangerous to liberty, and shall not 
be kept up; and the military shall be in strict subordination to the civil 
power.26 
The emphasis on textual differences between the federal and state constitutions has 
been one of the earliest and most persuasive features of the NJF.  Alan Tarr has 
pointed out the appeal of textualism, in addition to historical analysis, as a method to 
support a state constitutional decision going beyond federal constitutional minimum 
standards.27 
A second very influential element of state constitutional interpretation in the NJF 
has been reliance on the history of the provision being interpreted.28  In Arnold the 
Ohio Supreme Court noted, however, that both the 1802 and 1851 versions of the 
Right to Bear Arms Clause were adopted without debate in those respective 
constitutional conventions.29 
The Ohio Supreme Court acknowledged that it had not until then been a 
participant in the NJF, cited the article that declared its performance “a failure,”30 
and issued its Declaration of Ohio State Constitutional Independence:   
In joining the growing trend in other states, we believe that the Ohio 
Constitution is a document of independent force.  In the areas of 
individual rights and civil liberties, the United States Constitution, where 
applicable to the states, provides a floor below which state court decisions 
may not fall.  As long as state courts provide at least as much protection 
                                                                
2567 Ohio St. 3d 35, 616 N.E.2d 163 (1993). 
26OHIO CONST. art. I, § 4. 
27Tarr, supra note 15, at 847-48 (“[E]ven when state and federal constitutions contained 
analogous provisions, the language of the provisions often differed; and where these textual 
differences were substantial, they seemed to call for independent interpretation.  This was 
especially true when it could be shown that the textual differences reflected a distinctive 
historical experience or were designed to incorporate a particular perspective.”); see also 
Joseph R. Grodin, Commentary: Some Reflections on State Constitutions, 15 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 391, 400 (1988) (“The presence of distinctive language or history obviously 
presents the most comfortable context for relying upon independent state grounds.”); Peter 
Linzer, Why Bother with State Bills of Rights?, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1573, 1584-85, 1607-08, 1610 
(1990). 
28Tarr, supra note 15, at 848 (“[I]f a divergent interpretation may be justified by reference 
to the distinctive origins or purpose of a provision, then state jurists must pay particular 
attention to the intent of the framers and to the historical circumstances out of which the 
constitutional provisions arose.”). 
2967 Ohio St. 3d at 43, 616 N.E.2d at 169. 
30Id. at 42 n.8, 616 N.E.2d at 168 n.8. 
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2004
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as the United States Supreme Court has provided in its interpretation of 
the federal Bill of Rights, state courts are unrestricted in according greater 
civil liberties and protections to individuals and groups.31  
The court went on, however, to note that no rights are unlimited, and that the state’s 
police power always has to be considered a counter force to assertions of rights.  On 
this basis, it concluded that Cleveland’s specific ban on assault weapons was 
reasonable under the circumstances and would be upheld.32 
B.  NJF Methodology 
After Arnold, questions arose in Ohio, as they have in all states that embark on 
the NJF, as to what techniques and methodology the court should use when 
interpreting state constitutional rights guarantees, which of those rights should be 
construed more expansively than their federal analogues, and under what 
circumstances would such an outcome be appropriate.  This article now turns to 
some preliminary observations on these matters, without purporting to be an 
exhaustive analysis of Ohio’s state constitutional rights decisions of the last decade.   
I have referred to U.S. Supreme Court decisions denying rights claims as the 
“middle” of American constitutional litigation,33 and expansive state court decisions 
after the Supreme Court’s rejection of similar federal constitutional claims as 
“second looks” at constitutional issues.34  This is no longer, as noted above, a recent 
phenomenon.  One commentator noted bluntly almost twenty years ago: “The ‘new 
federalism’ isn’t new anymore.”35  But it is not the absence of judicial activism that 
should be criticized.  Rather, it is the Ohio courts’ apparent failure, until recently, 
seriously to consider state constitutional claims, regardless of the ultimate outcome, 
that merits criticism.  Win or lose, state constitutional arguments must still be 
considered and analyzed. 
In a 1997 decision, State v. Robinette,36 the Ohio Supreme Court considered 
whether, as a matter of state constitutional search and seizure law, a police officer 
must inform a person that he is “free to go” after a valid traffic stop.  The court had 
earlier concluded in the same litigation that, under both the federal and state 
constitutions, such a statement had to be given.37  The court’s opinion did not contain 
a “plain statement” that its decision was based on an adequate and independent state 
                                                                
31Id. at 42, 616 N.E.2d at 168-69.  See also State ex rel. Ohio AFL-CIO v. Ohio Bureau of 
Workers’ Compensation, 97 Ohio St. 3d 504, 514, 780 N.E.2d 981, 991-92 (2002) (declaring 
in a search and seizure case that Ohio’s constitution is a “document of independent force”). 
3267 Ohio St. 3d at 44-49, 616 N.E.2d at 170-73. 
33Williams, In the Supreme Court’s Shadow, supra note 14, at 360. 
34Id. at 361. 
35Ronald K.L. Collins, Foreword: Reliance on State Constitutions—Beyond the “New 
Federalism,” 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. vi (1984); Ronald K.L. Collins, Foreword: The Once 
“New Judicial Federalism” and Its Critics, 64 WASH. L. REV. 5 (1989). 
3680 Ohio St. 3d 234, 685 N.E.2d 762 (1997). 
37State v. Robinette, 73 Ohio St. 3d 650, 653 N.E.2d 695 (1995). 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol51/iss3/7
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law ground, as required by the U.S. Supreme Court in Michigan v. Long.38  There, 
the U.S. Supreme Court had stated:   
Accordingly, when, as in this case, a state court decision fairly appears to 
rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with federal law, and 
when the adequacy and independence of any possible state law ground is 
not clear from the face of the opinion, we will accept as the most 
reasonable explanation that the state court decided the case the way it did 
because it believed that federal law required it to do so.  If a state court 
chooses merely to rely on federal precedents as it would on the precedents 
of all other jurisdictions, then it need only make clear by a plain statement 
in its judgment or opinion that the federal cases are being used only for 
the purpose of guidance, and do not themselves compel the result that the 
court has reached.  In this way, both justice and judicial administration 
will be greatly improved.  If the state court decision indicates clearly and 
expressly that it is alternatively based on bona fide separate, adequate, and 
independent grounds, we, of course, will not undertake to review the 
decision.39   
In Robinette, therefore, the U.S. Supreme Court was able to accept the case for 
review and reversed on the federal constitutional ground, remanding the case to the 
Ohio Supreme Court.40   
The procedural history of Robinette provides a perfect illustration of Justice 
Stevens’s objections to the Michigan v. Long approach.  In dissenting from that 
decision, Justice Stevens had criticized the majority for adopting a presumption of 
U.S. Supreme Court jurisdiction: 
These are not cases in which an American citizen has been deprived of a 
right secured by the United States Constitution or a federal statute.  
Rather, they are cases in which a state court has upheld a citizen’s 
assertion of a right, finding the citizen to be protected under both federal 
and state law.  The complaining party is an officer of the state itself, who 
asks us to rule that the state court interpreted federal rights too broadly 
and “overprotected” the citizen.  Such cases should not be of inherent 
concern to this Court. 
* * * *  
                                                                
38463 U.S. 1032 (1983).  A survey of over 500 decisions, from all 50 states, between the 
time of the Michigan v. Long decision and the beginning of 1988, concluded that “few states 
have adopted a consistent, concise way of communicating the bases for their constitutional 
decisions.”  Felicia A. Rosenfield, Fulfilling the Goals of Michigan v. Long: The State Court 
Reaction, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 1041, 1068 (1988).  See generally Richard W. Westling, 
Comment, Advisory Opinions and the “Constitutionally Required” Adequate and Independent 
State Grounds Doctrine, 63 TULANE L. REV. 379 (1988); Stewart G. Pollock, Adequate and 
Independent State Grounds as a Means of Balancing the Relationship Between State and 
Federal Courts, 63 TEX. L. REV. 977 (1985); Eric B. Schnurer, The Inadequate and Dependent 
“Adequate and Independent State Grounds” Doctrine, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 371 (1991). 
39463 U.S. at 1040-41. 
40Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996). 
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2004
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Until recently we had virtually no interest in cases of this type....Some 
time during the past decade...our priorities shifted.  The result is a docket 
swollen with requests by states to reverse judgments that their courts have 
rendered in favor of their citizens.  I am confident that a future Court will 
recognize the error of this allocation of resources.  When that day comes, I 
think it likely that the Court will also reconsider the propriety of today’s 
expansion of our jurisdiction.41 
Three years later, Justice Stevens continued his critique in Delaware v. Van 
Arsdale:42 
Even if the Court is unconcerned by the waste inherent in review of such 
cases, even if it is unmoved by the incongruity between the wholly 
precatory nature of our pronouncements on such occasions and Art. III’s 
prohibition of advisory opinions, it should be concerned by the inevitable 
intrusion upon the prerogatives of state courts that can only provide a 
potential source of friction and thereby threaten to undermine the respect 
on which we must depend for the faithful, conscientious application of 
this Court’s expositions of federal law.  Less obvious is the impact on 
mutual trust when the state court on remand—perhaps out of misplaced 
sense of duty—confines its state constitution to the boundaries marked by 
this Court for the Federal Constitution.43 
Justice Stevens went on to suggest that state courts follow the primacy or “first-
things-first” approach, rather than the interstitial approach, as a way of clearly 
differentiating their state constitutional from federal constitutional analysis.44 
In any event, on remand the Ohio Supreme Court reconsidered its earlier 
conclusion that the state constitution (in addition to the federal constitution) required 
a “free to go” statement by law enforcement officials after a valid traffic stop.  The 
court, noting the identical state and federal constitutional texts, and relying on earlier 
decisions, decided to adopt the U.S. Supreme Court’s view of the Fourth 
Amendment as the authoritative judicial interpretation of the state constitutional 
search and seizure clause.  The court relied specifically on its 1981 decision State v. 
Geraldo, where it had stated: 
It is our opinion that the reach of Section 14, Article I of the Ohio 
Constitution with respect to the warrantless monitoring of a consenting 
informant’s telephone conversation is coextensive with that of the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.  As a consequence thereof, 
appellant’s failure to prove a violation of the Fourth Amendment dictates 
                                                                
41Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. at 1067-68, 1069-70 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (paragraph 
break omitted). 
42475 U.S. 673 (1986). 
43Id. at 699 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (paragraph break omitted). 
44Id. at 701-07 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  For a description of the primacy approach, see 
Williams, In the Glare of the Supreme Court, supra note 14, at 1018. 
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol51/iss3/7
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the conclusion that his rights under Section 14, Article I of the Ohio 
Constitution have not been violated either.45 
The court noted the need for uniformity in this area of criminal procedure, and noted 
that in the future, in the absence of “persuasive reasons to find otherwise,” it would 
follow the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretations of the Fourth Amendment as a 
matter of Ohio constitutional law.46  The Ohio Supreme Court seems to have adopted 
the “interstitial”47 approach to the NJF, stating that after the federal Bill of Rights 
was made applicable to the states, “the United States Constitution became the 
primary mechanism to safeguard an individual’s rights.”48  Under the interstitial 
approach, a state court looks first to the federal constitution and only if the rights 
claimant does not prevail on that claim does the court reach the state constitutional 
claim, relying on the state constitution to fill in gaps in federal constitutional 
protections.49 
The decision by the Ohio Supreme Court in Robinette could be seen as an 
example of Justice Stevens’s warning about the “misplaced sense of duty” that state 
courts might feel after the U.S. Supreme Court made its ruling in a case based on 
both the state and federal constitutions.  On the other hand, Robinette can also be 
seen as an example of “reflective adoptionism,” as described by Dr. Barry Latzer: 
It is illogical, the argument runs, to retract state constitutional rights 
simply because the Supreme Court has not found those rights in the U.S. 
Constitution.  This argument is quite persuasive if the premise of 
unreflective adoptionism is correct.  However, if the state courts are not 
merely presuming that state and federal law are alike, but are coming to 
this conclusion after independent evaluation of the meaning of the state 
provision, then the critique collapses.  There is nothing improper in 
concluding that the Supreme Court’s construction of similar text is sound.  
Adoptionism is not per se unjustifiable.50 
                                                                
4580 Ohio St. 3d at 239, 685 N.E.2d at 767 (citing State v. Geraldo, 68 Ohio St. 2d 120, 
126, 429 N.E.2d 141, 146 (1981)).  See also State v. Andrews, 57 Ohio St. 3d 86, 87 n.1, 565 
N.E.2d 1271, 1273 n.1 (1991). 
4680 Ohio St. 3d at 239, 685 N.E.2d at 767.  The court cited two cases for the proposition 
that it had applied the “persuasive reasons” approach to several other provisions.  Id. at 238, 
685 N.E.2d at 766.  See Eastwood Mall, Inc. v. Slanco, 68 Ohio St. 3d 221, 222-23, 626 
N.E.2d 59, 60 (1994); State v. Gustafson, 76 Ohio St. 3d 425, 432, 668 N.E.2d 435, 441 
(1996).  In fact, although both of these cases interpret the Ohio Constitution coextensively 
with the federal Constitution, neither of them mentions the “persuasive reasons” approach. 
47Williams, In the Glare of the Supreme Court, supra note 14, at 1018. 
4880 Ohio St. 3d at 237, 685 N.E.2d at 766. 
49See, e.g., Stewart G. Pollock, State Constitutions as Separate Sources of Fundamental 
Rights, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 707, 708 (1983) (“The challenge is to develop a jurisprudence of 
state constitutional law, a jurisprudence that will make more predictable the recourse to and 
the results of state constitutional law analysis.”); Developments in the Law: The Interpretation 
of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1326, 1361 (1982). 
50Barry Latzer, The New Judicial Federalism and Criminal Justice: Two Problems and a 
Response, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 863, 864 (1991) (paragraph break omitted). 
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Dr. Latzer also noted that “law ambiguity...refers to cases in which the state court 
fails to make clear, in its judicial opinion, whether the decision was based on an 
interpretation of the U.S. Constitution, the State Constitution or both.”51  He 
concluded: 
Even law-ambiguity may be viewed as a mark of caution: perhaps the 
failure to “commit” state law to a position is a way of preserving future 
interpretive options, so that the court could someday say that the previous 
case was not construing the state constitution after all.  In any event, one 
point is clear beyond question: state constitutional law is not just about 
broadening rights that the Supreme Court has narrowed.52 
C.  Backlash—The Criteria Approach? 
There is another important element contained in the Ohio Supreme Court’s 
decision on remand in Robinette.  In stating that it would follow the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s interpretations of the Fourth Amendment when interpreting the Ohio 
Constitution’s Search and Seizure Clause, the Ohio court seems to have been 
creating a “presumption of correctness” for U.S. Supreme Court decisions, at least in 
the area of search and seizure.  While it did not define what might constitute 
“persuasive reasons to find otherwise,” this approach can be seen as a tentative 
adoption of the “criteria” approach.  I have described the “criteria approach” as 
follows: 
Under this methodology, the state supreme court...sets forth a list of 
circumstances (criteria or factors) under which it says it will feel justified 
in interpreting its state constitution more broadly than the Federal 
Constitution.  These criteria, then, are used by advocates to present, and 
judges to decide, claims made under the state constitution in cases where 
there is also a federal claim that is unlikely to prevail.  On the one hand, 
the criteria approach is laudable because it teaches and calls attention to 
the nature of state constitutional arguments.  On the other hand, however, 
I have been critical of this approach for a number of reasons that I believe 
have demonstrated themselves in the past fifteen years.53 
A number of states that follow the “interstitial” approach to state constitutional rights 
interpretation have attempted to set forth criteria, or factors, which might be relied on 
by the court to justify a more expansive interpretation of a state constitutional clause 
despite a contrary ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court.  This criteria approach, 
although it serves positive functions in terms of educating the lower bench and the 
bar, has the potential to be a substantially limiting doctrine with respect to 
independent state constitutional interpretation. 
Although the Ohio Supreme Court does not seem to have expanded its 
“persuasive reasons,” or tentative criteria approach, beyond the search and seizure 
                                                                
51Barry Latzer, Into the 90s:  More Evidence that the Revolution Has a Conservative 
Underbelly, 4 EMERGING ISSUES IN STATE CONST. L. 17, 21 (1991). 
52Id. at 32. 
53See Williams, In the Glare of the Supreme Court, supra note 14, at 1021-22. 
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area, it recently applied this approach retroactively.  In a 2002 decision in State v. 
Murrell,54 the court reexamined its 1992 search and seizure decision in State v. 
Brown.55  Although Brown had attempted to distinguish the controlling U.S. 
Supreme Court interpretation of the federal Constitution, the Murrell court 
determined that the attempted distinction was based on a faulty understanding of the 
Supreme Court decision.56  The court, therefore, had to decide whether to reaffirm 
Brown and interpret the Ohio Constitution’s search and seizure clause more 
expansively than the federal constitutional requirements, on the one hand, or to 
overrule Brown, on the other hand.  Determining that there were no “persuasive 
reasons” for diverging from federal analysis, either originally in 1992 or in 2002, the 
court determined to overrule Brown.57 
As an aside, the Ohio Supreme Court, like most state supreme courts, did not 
consider whether the doctrine of stare decisis was any different in state constitutional 
law from its federal constitutional law counterpart.  In other words, even though 
federal constitutional precedents are said to be only correctable by the U.S. Supreme 
Court itself because of the relative difficulty of amending the federal Constitution, 
state constitutional precedents might not be considered in the same light because of 
the relative ease of amending state constitutions.58 
It is also important to note that in the search and seizure context, courts rarely 
have to consider the constitutionality of a statute.59  It is, rather, the actions of 
executive branch law enforcement officers that must be considered.  This distinction 
has been recognized by the Ohio Supreme Court.60 
I have associated the development of a criteria approach with the onset of a stage 
two backlash in the evolution of the New Judicial Federalism.  Ohio’s version is 
rather mild, and in applying the criteria approach to search and seizure cases, the 
Ohio Supreme Court is in the company of a number of other states that see the value 
of uniformity in search and seizure doctrine.61  It remains to be seen, of course, 
whether the Ohio Supreme Court will expand its “persuasive reasons” approach into 
other areas of rights protection under the state constitution.  The Arnold decision, of 
course, with its emphasis on textual difference, relies on the criterion that is number 
one on most states’ lists of reasons they will consider diverging from federal 
constitutional law. 
                                                                
5494 Ohio St. 3d 489, 764 N.E.2d 986 (2002). 
5563 Ohio St. 3d 349, 588 N.E.2d 113 (1992). 
5694 Ohio St. 3d at 493, 764 N.E.2d at 990. 
57Id. at 495-96, 764 N.E.2d at 993. 
58Williams, Brennan Lecture, supra note 7, at 227-29. 
59Id. at 221. 
60City of Cleveland v. Trzebuckowski, 85 Ohio St. 3d 524, 531 n.2, 709 N.E.2d 1148, 
1153 n.2 (1999). 
61See, e.g., State v. Florance, 527 P.2d 1202, 1209 (Or. 1974); People v. Gonzalez, 465 
N.E.2d 823, 825 (N.Y. 1984).  See generally Earl M. Maltz, The Dark Side of State Court 
Activism, 63 TEX. L. REV. 995, 1006-23 (1985). 
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D.  Distinctive Text: Religion 
In 2000 the Ohio Supreme Court considered another case involving a substantial 
textual distinction between the federal and state constitutions.  In Humphrey v. 
Lane,62 the court considered a free exercise of religion claim by a Native American 
who, for religious reasons, wanted to wear long hair despite a Department of 
Corrections regulation to the contrary.63  Here, again, the court confronted a claim 
that did not require it to evaluate the constitutionality of a statute, but rather an 
executive branch administrative regulation.64  The court noted the substantial 
distinction between the texts of the First Amendment and Ohio’s Article I, Section 7.  
The Ohio provision reads:   
All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God 
according to the dictates of their own conscience.  No person shall be 
compelled to attend, erect, or support any place of worship, or maintain 
any form of worship, against his consent; and no preference shall be 
given, by law, to any religious society; nor shall any interference with the 
rights of conscience be permitted.  No religious test shall be required, as a 
qualification for office, nor shall any person be incompetent to be a 
witness on account of his religious belief; but nothing herein shall be 
construed to dispense with oaths and affirmations.  Religion, morality, and 
knowledge, however, being essential to good government, it shall be the 
duty of the General Assembly to pass suitable laws, to protect every 
religious denomination in the peaceable enjoyment of its own mode of 
public worship, and to encourage schools and the means of instruction.65 
Assessing the structural differences in the provisions, the court noted that, by 
contrast to the First Amendment, “the Ohio Constitution contains a section devoted 
entirely to freedom of religion.”66  The court was very specific in describing its 
federal-state textual comparison:   
Verbiage does not indicate commitment to an ideal.  The one phrase in the 
United States Constitution regarding the freedom of religion is one of the 
most powerful statements in human history.  Ohio’s more detailed 
description of the right does not by itself prove that Ohio’s framers 
created a broader freedom of religion than exists in the United States 
Constitution.  However, the words of the Ohio framers do indicate their 
intent to make an independent statement on the meaning and extent of the 
freedom.  Whether that statement creates a relevant difference is the 
                                                                
6289 Ohio St. 3d 62, 728 N.E.2d 1039 (2000). 
63Id. at 62-64, 728 N.E.2d at 1041-42. 
64See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text. 
65OHIO CONST. art. I, § 7.  See generally G. Alan Tarr, Church and State in the States, 64 
WASH. L. REV. 73 (1989). 
6689 Ohio St. 3d at 66, 728 N.E.2d at 1043. 
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question we face today.  In employing our comparison we are not doing a 
mere word count, but instead are looking for a qualitative difference.67 
The court concluded that the tests under this provision required a compelling state 
interest to justify the restriction on religious practice, as well as the least restrictive 
alternative.  The court held that the state did have a compelling interest, but that it 
had not chosen the least restrictive alternative to accomplish that interest.68 
In the Humphrey situation, there was a very clear federal constitutional 
conclusion that the rights claimant would not be protected.  This was clear from the 
U.S. Supreme Court decision in Employment Division v. Smith,69 which had fairly 
recently changed federal First Amendment analysis of free exercise of religion 
claims.  Knowing that, in the past, it had followed federal analysis despite the wide 
textual distinctions, the court indicated that it was not now willing to follow the new 
Smith test for a free exercise of religion claim.70  The court did not make any attempt 
to specify any “persuasive reasons otherwise.”  It is true, of course, as noted above, 
that textual differences constitute the most persuasive reason for divergent state 
constitutional interpretation.  Interestingly, however, just the year before, the Ohio 
Supreme Court, in an establishment of religion claim, had rejected arguments based 
on the same textual distinctions, and decided to follow the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
Lemon71 test and not to diverge from it.72 
That 1999 decision, Simmons-Harris v. Goff, was a challenge to Ohio’s school 
voucher statute.  The Ohio Supreme Court stated that the federal and Ohio religion 
provisions were “the approximate equivalent.”73  The court noted that it had “had 
little cause to examine” the Ohio clause and had “never enunciated a standard for 
determining whether a statute violates it.”74  The court proceeded to adopt the federal 
constitutional Lemon test,75 but did not conclude that the federal and state provisions 
were “coextensive,”76 nor did it commit to “irreversibly tie ourselves” to the federal 
constitutional standards.77  Citing Arnold, it stated: 
                                                                
67Id. at 66-67, 728 N.E.2d at 1043-44 (paragraph break omitted). 
68Id. at 71, 728 N.E.2d at 1047.  The identical Department of Corrections hair-length 
regulation had survived a First Amendment challenge in federal court, in litigation that did not 
raise a state constitutional claim.  Blanken v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corrections, 944 F. 
Supp. 1359 (S.D. Ohio 1996).  On state constitutional claims in federal court, see supra note 7. 
69494 U.S. 872 (1990).  See Stuart G. Parsell, Note, Revitalization of the Free Exercise of 
Religion Under State Constitutions: A Response to Employment Division v. Smith, 68 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 747 (1993). 
7089 Ohio St. 3d at 68, 728 N.E.2d at 1044-45. 
71Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
72Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 86 Ohio St. 3d 1, 711 N.E.2d 203 (1999). 
73Id. at 10, 711 N.E.2d at 211. 
74Id. at 10, 711 N.E.2d at 211. 
75See supra note 71. 
7686 Ohio St. 3d at 10, 711 N.E.2d at 211. 
77Id. at 10, 711 N.E.2d at 212. 
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We reserve the right to adopt a different constitutional standard pursuant 
to the Ohio Constitution, whether because the federal constitutional 
standard changes or for any other relevant reason.78 
Of course, it was because “the federal constitutional standard chang[ed]” that the 
court in Humphrey, just a year later, gave independent force to Article I, Section 7 in 
the free-exercise, long-hair case.79 
E.  Equal Protection: More Distinctive Text 
In 2002 the Ohio Supreme Court decided the latest in a line of cases interpreting 
Article I, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution, which provides:   
All political power is inherent in the people.  Government is instituted for 
their equal protection and benefit, and they have the right to alter, reform, 
or abolish the same, whenever they may deem it necessary; and no special 
privileges or immunities shall ever be granted, that may not be altered, 
revoked, or repealed by the General Assembly.80 
In State v. Thompson,81 the court considered a challenge to Ohio’s “importuning” 
statute, which prohibited persons of the same gender, but not those of the opposite 
gender, from soliciting sex acts from others.  In an earlier decision, the court had 
saved this statute from a free speech challenge under the state constitution by 
imposing a limiting interpretation requiring “fighting words.”82  Because the free 
speech claim was no longer available,83 the court entertained an equal protection 
challenge.  Relying on an earlier case,84 the court reiterated its view that Ohio’s 
“equal protection” provision was “functionally equivalent” to the Fourteenth 
Amendment Equal Protection Clause.85  It therefore applied the federal levels of 
scrutiny analysis, concluding that the statute was “facially invalid as a content-based 
restriction on speech, which by extension violates the equal protection guarantees 
both United States and Ohio Constitutions.”86  The court, once again, failed to 
provide any “plain statement” under Michigan v. Long,87 and therefore this decision 
was potentially reviewable by the U.S. Supreme Court on the federal constitutional 
                                                                
78Id. at 10, 711 N.E.2d at 212 (emphasis added). 
79See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text. 
80OHIO CONST. art. I, § 2 (emphasis added).  See Williams, supra note 3, at 395 (referring 
to art. I, § 2 as a “potentially interesting Equal Protection and Benefit clause”). 
8195 Ohio St. 3d 264, 767 N.E.2d 251 (2002). 
82State v. Phipps, 58 Ohio St. 2d 271, 389 N.E.2d 1128 (1979). 
8395 Ohio St. 3d at 265-66, 767 N.E.2d at 254-55.  The concurring opinion would have 
ruled on free speech and overruled the earlier case.  Id. at 273, 767 N.E.2d at 260-61 (Pfeifer, 
J., concurring). 
84American Association of University Professors v. Central State University, 87 Ohio St. 
3d 55, 717 N.E.2d 286 (1999). 
8595 Ohio St. 3d at 266, 767 N.E.2d at 255. 
86Id. at 266, 767 N.E.2d at 255. 
87See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
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ground.  The State, however, did not seek review in the U.S. Supreme Court, 
probably because it had substantial doubts itself as to the constitutionality of the 
statute.88 
As authority for its “functionally equivalent” approach to state equal protection, 
the Ohio Supreme Court cited its 1999 decision in American Association of 
University Professors v. Central State University.89  This was another situation where 
the court had ruled earlier on both federal and state constitutional grounds,90 the U.S. 
Supreme Court accepted the case and reversed,91 and the case returned on remand to 
the Ohio Supreme Court.  There was a clearly independent state constitutional 
equality argument made92 and rejected93 by the court.  The Ohio Supreme Court’s 
“functionally equivalent,” lockstep approach seems to have been applied 
consistently,94 at least since 1937.95   
Ohio’s Article I, Section 2 is, of course, both textually distinct from the 
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause, as well as emanating from a 
different period in history, and, undoubtedly, being aimed at a different set of 
concerns from those at which the federal constitutional provision was aimed after the 
Civil War.  There are a number of states which, like Ohio, equate their different 
equality provisions with the federal Equal Protection Clause, so Ohio’s position is 
not unusual.  This approach does, however, fail to acknowledge the differing text, 
history, and purposes of its state constitutional equality guarantees.96  Other states 
                                                                
8895 Ohio St. 3d at 266, 767 N.E.2d at 255. 
8987 Ohio St. 3d 55, 717 N.E.2d 286 (1999). 
90American Association of University Professors v. Central State University, 83 Ohio St. 
3d 229, 233, 699 N.E.2d 463, 467 (1998) (“These two provisions are functionally equivalent, 
and the standards for determining violations of equal protection are essentially the same under 
state and federal law.”). 
91Central State University v. American Association of University Professors, 526 U.S. 124 
(1999).  Justice Stevens, predictably, dissented: 
Seven of the eleven Ohio judges who reviewed the case concluded that the Ohio 
statute violated the Ohio Constitution.  Indeed, the majority opinion of the Ohio 
Supreme Court did not cite a single case decided by this Court.  If the State Supreme 
Court did misconstrue the Equal Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution, the 
impact of that arguable error is of consequence only in the State of Ohio, and will, in 
any event, turn out to be totally harmless if that court adheres to its previously 
announced interpretation of the State Constitution.  I therefore believe that the Court 
should deny the petition for certiorari. 
Id. at 131-32 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (paragraph break omitted). 
9287 Ohio St. 3d at 56-60, 717 N.E.2d at 289-91. 
93Id. at 60, 717 N.E.2d at 291. 
94See, e.g., State ex rel. Dayton Fraternal Order of Police v. State Employment Relations 
Bd., 22 Ohio St. 3d 1, 6, 488 N.E.2d 181, 185 (1986); Fabrey v. McDonald Police Dept., 70 
Ohio St. 3d 351, 353, 639 N.E.2d 31, 33 (1994). 
95State ex rel. Struble v. Davis, 132 Ohio St. 555, 560, 9 N.E.2d 684, 687 (1937) 
(“substantially the same”). 
96See generally Robert F. Williams, Equality Guarantees in State Constitutional Law, 63 
TEX. L. REV. 1195, 1196 (1985) (“Most state constitutions do not contain an ‘equal protection’ 
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that initially equated their equality clauses with federal doctrines have begun to 
move in the direction of independence.  States like Indiana,97 Vermont,98 
Minnesota,99 Alaska,100 and Idaho101 have been moving to decouple their state 
constitutional equality doctrines from the formerly dominant federal equal protection 
analysis. 
It should also be noted that the Ohio Constitution contains another clause—
Article I, Section 1—that has been interpreted in other states to provide a guarantee 
of equality.  Article I, Section 1 provides:   
All men are, by nature, free and independent, and have certain inalienable 
rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, 
acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and seeking and obtaining 
happiness and safety.102 
States like New Jersey have interpreted these provisions as the basis for their 
equality jurisprudence.103  The Ohio Constitution contains, as well, a number of other 
provisions reflecting equality concerns, such as the requirements of uniformity in 
taxation,104 and that general laws have a uniform operation throughout the state.105   
                                                          
clause.  But they do contain a variety of equality protections.”).  For further elaboration of the 
differences between federal equal protection and state equality provisions, see Robert F. 
Williams, A “Row of Shadows”: Pennsylvania’s Misguided Lockstep Approach to Its State 
Constitutional Equality Doctrine, 3 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 343 (1993); Robert F. Williams, 
Foreword: The Importance of an Independent State Constitutional Equality Doctrine in 
School Finance Cases and Beyond, 24 CONN. L. REV. 675 (1992).  For an excellent treatment 
of equality provisions in state constitutions, see 1 JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, CLAIMS AND DEFENSES 3-1 to 3-55 (3d ed. 2000). 
97See, e.g., Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72 (Ind. 1994). 
98See, e.g., Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).  See also Robert F. Williams, Old 
Constitutions and New Issues: National Lessons From Vermont’s State Constitutional Case on 
Marriage of Same-Sex Couples, 43 B.C. L. REV. 73 (2001). 
99See, e.g., Ann L. Iijima, Minnesota Equal Protection in the Third Millennium: “Old 
Formulations” or “New Articulations”?, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 338, 348-81 (1994) 
(discussing deviations between the Minnesota Supreme Court’s interpretation of the state and 
federal equal protection clauses). 
100See, e.g., Matanuska-Susitna Borough Sch. Dist. v. State, 931 P.2d 391, 402 (Alaska 
1997); Paul E. McGreal, Alaska Equal Protection: Constitutional Law or Common Law?, 15 
ALASKA L. REV. 1, 11-17 (1995); Michael B. Wise, Northern Lights—Equal Protection 
Analysis in Alaska, 3 ALASKA L. REV. 1 (1986). 
101See, e.g., Concerned Taxpayers of Kootenai County v. Kootenai County, 50 P.3d 991, 
994 (Idaho 2002).  But see Rudeen v. Cenarrusa, 38 P.3d 598, 606-07 (Idaho 2001). 
102OHIO CONST. art. I, § 1.  See Williams, supra note 3, at 395 n.27 (noting potential of art. 
I, § 1). 
103ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE NEW JERSEY STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 29-
30 (rev. ed. 1997). 
104OHIO CONST. art. XII, § 2. 
105OHIO CONST. art. II, § 26. 
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Critics of the federal equal protection approach point to a number of reasons for 
developing an independent approach to interpreting equality provisions.  For 
example, Professor Lawrence Sager pointed out that the federal Equal Protection 
Clause is among the most “underenforced” of federal constitutional provisions.106  
This underenforcement pattern is due to the deference to states because of concerns 
for federalism, the rigid application of the state-action requirement, and the tiered 
“suspect class/levels of scrutiny” constructs imposed by the U.S. Supreme Court.107  
Thus, federal equal protection decisions should hardly be viewed as limiting the 
interpretation of state constitutional equality provisions. 
In addition, several years after Professor Sager offered his underenforcement 
thesis, he described another important reason why state courts should not blindly 
follow federal constitutional interpretations.108  Describing the substantial role of 
“strategic” considerations in judicial enforcement of constitutional norms, Professor 
Sager identified the possibility of state and federal courts employing different 
strategies in constitutional interpretation: “Like other legal rules, constitutional rules 
bear pragmatic, strategic relationship to the concerns that animate them.  Norms of 
political morality comprise the targets of constitutional law, but not the necessary or 
exclusive content of its rules.”109  He noted that strategic concerns account, in part, 
for the Supreme Court’s limiting equal protection doctrines.110  State courts, 
interpreting their own constitutions, may see the need to employ different strategies, 
even though they are applying a similar “norm of political morality” equality.111  
Sager concluded: 
State judges confront institutional environments and histories that vary 
dramatically from state to state, and that differ, in any one state, from the 
homogenized, abstracted, national vision from which the Supreme Court 
is forced to operate.  It is natural and appropriate that in fashioning 
                                                                
106Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional 
Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1218-20 (1978). 
107Professor Sager stated: 
While there is no litmus test for distinguishing these norms, there are indicia of 
underenforcement.  These include a disparity between the scope of federal judicial 
construct and that of plausible understandings of the constitutional concept from 
which it derives, the presence in court opinions of frankly institutional explanations 
for setting particular limits to a federal judicial construct, and other anomalies. 
Id. at 1218-19.   
108Professor Sager asked, “[T]o what extent, if any, should state judges faced with claims 
under provisions of their state constitutions feel themselves bound to defer to Supreme Court 
interpretations of equivalent federal constitutional provisions?”  Lawrence G. Sager, 
Foreword: State Courts and the Strategic Space Between the Norms and Rules of 
Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 959, 959 (1985); see also Linzer, supra note 27, at 1580 
(“The gut issue, though, is how closely the state courts should follow federal precedents in 
applying their states’ provisions.”). 
109Sager, supra note 108, at 962 (emphasis in original). 
110Id. at 974. 
111Id. at 967. 
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constitutional rules the state judges’ instrumental impulses and judgments 
differ. 
* * * * 
In light of the substantial strategic element in the composition of 
constitutional rules, the sensitivity of strategic concerns to variations in 
the political and social climate, the differences in the regulatory scope of 
the federal and state judiciaries, the diversity of state institutions, and the 
special familiarity of state judges with the actual working of those 
institutions, variations among state and federal constitutional rules ought 
to be both expected and welcomed.112 
F.  Free Speech: Still More Distinctive Text 
In a 1994 decision, Eastwood Mall, Inc. v. Slanco,113 the Ohio Supreme Court 
confronted the question, faced by a number of states,114 whether an injunction against 
picketing and leafletting in a privately-owned shopping mall violated Article I, 
Section 11 of the Ohio Constitution: 
Every citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all 
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of the right; and no law shall be 
passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech, or of the press.115 
There was a “well settled” negative answer to this question under the federal First 
Amendment.  Because there was no “state action,” the U.S. Supreme Court had 
already ruled against the identical claim.116 
The court acknowledged the substantial textual differences between the federal 
and Ohio provisions, and the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court had observed that 
states might recognize free speech rights in shopping malls,117 but it concluded, 
relying on a 1992 case,118 “that the free speech guarantees accorded by the Ohio 
Constitution are no broader than the First Amendment, and that the First Amendment 
                                                                
112Id. at 975-76; see also Lawrence G. Sager, Some Observations About Race, Sex, and 
Equal Protection, 59 TUL. L. REV. 928, 936-37 (1985). 
11368 Ohio St. 3d 221, 626 N.E.2d 59 (1994). 
114See, e.g., Jennifer A. Klear, Comparison of the Federal Courts’ and the New Jersey 
Supreme Court’s Treatments of Free Speech on Private Property: Where Won’t We Have the 
Freedom to Speak Next?, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 589 (2002). 
115OHIO CONST. art. I, § 11 (emphasis added).  For an in-depth analysis of the very similar 
Pennsylvania provision, see Seth F. Kreimer, The Pennsylvania Constitution’s Protection of 
Free Expression, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 12 (2002). 
11668 Ohio St. 3d at 222, 626 N.E.2d at 60 (citing Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 
(1976); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972)). 
117Id. at 222, 626 N.E.2d at 60-61 (citing Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 
(1980)). 
118Id. at 222-23, 626 N.E.2d at 61 (citing State ex rel. Rear Door Bookstore v. Tenth Dist. 
Ct. App., 63 Ohio St. 3d 354, 588 N.E.2d 116 (1992)). 
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is the proper basis for interpretation of Section 11, Article I of the Ohio 
Constitution.”119  The court continued: 
Furthermore, while Section 11 has an additional clause not found in the 
First Amendment, the plain language of this section, when read in its 
entirety, bans only the passing of a law that would restrain or abridge the 
liberty of speech.  When the First Amendment does not protect speech 
that infringes on private property rights, Section 11 does not protect that 
speech either.120 
The court cited the decisions of other state courts rejecting similar claims,121 relying 
on “horizontal federalism,” but did not analyze those decisions and did not even cite 
the decisions recognizing such claims.122  State courts often look horizontally for 
guidance from other state courts interpreting similar or identical state constitutional 
provisions, rather than looking vertically to U.S. Supreme Court decisions 
interpreting federal constitutional provisions.123  Labeled “horizontal federalism” by 
G. Alan Tarr and M.C. Porter,124 this is a common feature of the NJF. 
Justice Wright’s dissent characterized the decision as a “step backward” from 
Arnold, provided a careful textual analysis, distinguished the precedents relied on by 
the majority, and considered the cases in other states recognizing similar claims.125 
As noted above,126 the court relied on a 1992, pre-Arnold decision for the 
proposition that the Ohio free speech provision was “no broader” than the federal 
First Amendment’s protection of free speech.  That case involved a challenge to an 
injunction closing an adult bookstore for a year as a public nuisance.127  The Ohio 
Supreme Court affirmed the injunction without opinion, relying on the court of 
appeals opinion, which it included as an appendix.128  The Ohio Court of Appeals 
had followed the lead of the U.S. Supreme Court in upholding such injunctions,129 
                                                                
119Id. at 223, 626 N.E.2d at 61.  See also State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. 
Bond, 98 Ohio St. 3d 146, 150, 781 N.E.2d 180, 187 (2002).  But see Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Gardner, 99 Ohio St. 3d 416, 420, 793 N.E.2d 425, 429-30 (2003). 
12068 Ohio St. 3d at 223, 626 N.E.2d at 61. 
121Id. at 223 n.1, 626 N.E.2d at 61 n.1. 
122See Stanley H. Friedelbaum, Private Property, Public Property: Shopping Centers and 
Expressive Freedom in the States, 62 ALB. L. REV. 1229 (1999).  Professor Friedelbaum 
discusses Ohio’s Eastwood Mall case on pages 1243-45. 
123STATE SUPREME COURTS xxi-xxii (M.C. Porter & G. Alan Tarr eds., 1982). 
124Id. 
12568 Ohio St. 3d at 225-31, 626 N.E.2d at 62-67 (Wright, J., dissenting). 
126See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
127State ex rel. Rear Door Bookstore v. Tenth Dist. Ct. App., 63 Ohio St. 3d 354, 588 
N.E.2d 116 (1992). 
128Id. at 355, 588 N.E.2d at 118.  I will leave it to Ohio practitioners, scholars, and judges 
to assess the precedential force of such an “opinion.” 
129Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697 (1986). 
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rejecting the contrary view of New York’s highest court.130  Assessing state 
constitutional rulings from other jurisdictions on such adult-bookstore injunctions, 
the Ohio Court of Appeals concluded:  “In summary, decisions from our sister states 
can be cited to support almost any point of view.”131 
III.  CASE-BY-CASE ADOPTIONISM VERSUS PROSPECTIVE LOCKSTEPPING 
The Ohio decisions reveal an important point about the methods by which state 
courts may choose to follow U.S. Supreme Court interpretations of the federal 
Constitution.  The first approach may be referred to in Barry Latzer’s terms—
“unreflective adoptionism.”132  This would describe state court decisions simply 
applying federal analysis to a state clause without acknowledging the possibility of a 
different outcome, or considering arguments in favor of such a different, or more 
protective, outcome.  This might be an accurate description of the pre-1993 stance of 
the Ohio Supreme Court.133  The next approach, “reflective adoptionism,” would 
describe a state court decision acknowledging the possibility of different state and 
federal outcomes, considering the arguments in the specific case and, on balance, 
deciding to apply the federal analysis to the state provision. Simmon-Harris v. Goff, 
adopting federal establishment of religion doctrine, seems to reflect this approach.134  
Finally, however, a state court might engage in “prospective lockstepping,” where it 
announces that not only for the instant case, but also in the future, it will interpret the 
state and federal clauses the same.  This is what the court seemed to do in Robinette 
(search and seizure), Eastwood Mall (free speech and assembly), and in the equal 
protection cases.  In Robinette,135 the court stated that search and seizure cases would 
be evaluated by the federal constitutional standard, not just under the facts of that 
case, but also in the future if there were “no persuasive reasons to find otherwise.”136  
This approach purports to decide too much and to go beyond the court’s authority to 
adjudicate cases.  It could be argued that such an approach cannot be referred to as a 
“holding,” because it goes far beyond the facts of the case and purports to prejudge 
future cases.  It is not even clear if it qualifies as dictum.  Such statements, therefore, 
should neither bind lawyers in their arguments nor the court itself in future cases. 
Justice Robert Utter of the Supreme Court of Washington criticized the use of a 
similar lockstep approach to interpreting that state’s equality provisions, labeling 
such an approach a virtual “rewrite” of the state constitution without a constitutional 
convention or the people’s consent.137  Ron Collins argued that lockstepping results 
                                                                
13063 Ohio St. 3d at 359, 362, 588 N.E.2d at 121, 123 (rejecting People ex rel. Arcara v. 
Cloud Books, Inc., 503 N.E.2d 492 (N.Y. 1986)). 
131Rear Door Bookstore, 63 Ohio St. 3d at 359, 588 N.E.2d at 121. 
132See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
133See supra notes 13 and 30 and accompanying text. 
134See supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text. 
135See supra notes 36-53 and accompanying text. 
136See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
137State v. Smith, 814 P.2d 652, 661 (Wash. 1991) (Utter, J., concurring). 
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in the “Problem of the Vanishing Constitution,”138 where the state constitution is 
rendered a nullity, and the “Problem of Amending Without Amendments,”139 where 
the court, in effect, amends the state constitution by linking it, prospectively, to 
federal constitutional analysis.  This is not a valid exercise of judicial review.  The 
power to amend the state constitution, even to link its interpretation to federal 
constitutional doctrine, is a political power reserved to the state’s citizens.140 
Earl Maltz has argued in favor of lockstepping, or “the theory that state 
constitutional provisions should be interpreted to provide exactly the same 
protections as their federal constitutional counterparts.”141  He seems clearly, 
however, to be referring to case-by-case lockstepping, or adoptionism, rather than 
the prospective approach.  His argument is based on deference to the state legislative 
and executive branches, and on a criticism of judicial activism.142  He contends: 
In short, the substance of lockstep analysis is entirely consistent with the 
basic concept of state autonomy.  Of course, one can still attack the 
standard verbal formulations of the lockstep approach, which seem to 
suggest that U.S. Supreme Court decisions somehow create state 
constitutional law.  For lockstep courts, however, these flaws in 
articulation have little impact on the practical results reached.143 
I disagree with this assessment and contend that the Ohio Supreme Court’s 
prospective lockstepping goes far beyond “flaws in articulation.”  Rather, it has the 
effect of snuffing out the independent research and analysis that must be undertaken 
by lawyers, judges, professors, and students in order to make the Ohio Constitution, 
as stated in Arnold, “a document of independent force.”144 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
There are a number of tentative conclusions that may be reached based on this 
selective analysis145 of the Ohio Supreme Court’s first decade of experience with the 
                                                                
138Ronald K.L. Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions—The Montana Disaster, 63 TEX. 
L. REV. 1095, 1111 (1985). 
139Id. at 1116: 
When a state court withdraws from a constitutional provision its independent legal 
authority over state action, the court assumes a power that has been constitutionally 
delegated to others.  That power is the right of the people to “alter” their constitution. 
140Williams, supra note 17, at 216-17 (discussing “lockstep” and “forced linkage” 
amendments). 
141Earl M. Maltz, Lockstep Analysis and the Concept of Federalism, 496 ANNALS AM. 
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 98, 99 (March 1988).  See also Maltz, supra note 61. 
142Maltz, supra note 141, at 101, 106. 
143Id. at 102. 
14467 Ohio St. 3d at 42, 616 N.E.2d at 168-69.  I will explore these ideas in greater depth 
in State Courts Adopting Federal Constitutional Doctrine: Case-by-Case Adoptionism or 
Prospective Lockstepping?, ___ WM. & MARY L. REV. ___ (2004) (forthcoming). 
145I have not, for example, analyzed the Ohio state constitutional school finance 
litigation—see, e.g., Patricia F. First & Barbara M. DeLuca, The Meaning of Educational 
Adequacy: The Confusion of DeRolph, 32 J.L. & EDUC. 185 (2003). 
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New Judicial Federalism.  First, the court is to be commended for taking the first 
steps toward recognizing the Ohio Constitution as a document of independent 
political146 and legal force.  The Arnold decision, together with the others discussed 
in this article, serve to alert the lower bench, the bar, the media, and students and 
professors to the potential contained within state constitutions. 
Next, to the extent that there is inconsistency to be detected in the Ohio Supreme 
Court’s approach to the NJF, this has been true as well in most other states.147  State 
courts are now confronting major constitutional litigation in controversial cases.  The 
NJF is still relatively new in Ohio.  It is very far from being “settled.”148  The bar and 
legal educators have a responsibility to engage in teaching and analysis concerning 
state constitutional law, and not just in the area of rights protections.149  Oregon 
Justice Hans A. Linde said that in order “to make an independent argument under the 
state clause [it] takes homework—in texts, in history, in alternative approaches to 
analysis.”150  This Symposium will go a long way toward meeting that challenge. 
                                                                
146In the words of former Justice Hans Linde of Oregon, “[W]hat the judicial decision 
applies was first a political decision that others deemed worthy of constitutional magnitude.”  
Hans Linde, Without “Due Process”: Unconstitutional Law in Oregon, 49 OR. L. REV. 125, 
131 (1970) (emphasis added).  See also Hans Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist Tradition, 
82 YALE L.J. 227, 253 (1972) (“Constitution [is] directly obligatory on government, with 
judicial review as a consequence rather than as the source of obligation.”). 
147See, e.g., John W. Shaw, Comment, Principled Interpretations of State Constitutional 
Law: Why Don’t the “Primacy” States Practice What They Preach?, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 1019 
(1993); Williams, In the Glare of the Supreme Court, supra note 14, at 1016-17. 
148See Robert A. Sedler, The Settled Nature of American Constitutional Law, 48 WAYNE 
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149See Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Law: Teaching and Scholarship, 41 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 243 (1991). 
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L. REV. 379, 392 (1980). 
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